The Economic Environment:
The market consists of many borrowers, such that their mass is normalized to one and none of the borrowers is an atom.
For each project $1 to be borrowed for investment at an interest rate r ( >1): exogenously determined. Choice of project is private information. 
Assumptions:
2 Two types of borrowers: , ; 0,1 : fraction of S ; S has social capital s(>0); N does not have any social capital The social penalty involves a loss of social capital. An S type borrower taking a group-loan is assumed to lose her social capital if she defaults and, moreover, this default affects the other group-member. Thus, the social penalty is anonymous in the sense that it is imposed irrespective of whether the default affects an S type or an N type borrower. The borrowers all know one another's types, but the bank does not. H -r < b : ensures problem of moral hazard is not too small. Thus, N type borrowers will choose his/her second project. H -r > b -s : ensures social capital is not too small. Thus, S type borrowers will choose his/her first project. Time is discrete: t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. Let, 0 < δ < 1 denote the common discount factor of all the agents, the borrowers, as well as the bank.
Sequential Lending
Group-lending without Sequential Financing:
Consider the following infinite horizon game:
Period 0:
There is endogenous group-formation -the borrowers organize themselves into groups of two following the optimal sorting principle. For every t ≥1, there is a two-stage game:
Stage 1:
The bank randomly selects one of the groups as the recipient and lends it two dollars, which are divided equally among the two members of the selected group.
Stage 2:
The borrowers simultaneously make their project choice.
Group-lending without Sequential Financing: Definitions:
There is positive assortative matching if there are 2 groups of type SS and , 0 groups of type SS. We then describe our solution concept.
Group-lending without Sequential Financing:
Given the lending policy of the bank, once a group receives a loan, this group has zero probability of receiving a loan in the future. Hence, the members of this group are going to behave as if they are playing a one shot game. v ij : expected equilibrium payoff of a type i borrower at period t≥1 if she forms a group with a type j borrower and the group receives the bank loan at this period. There will be
Consider some period t ≥ 1 Stage 3: Payoff from investing in her first project: H-r Payoff from investing in her second project: b. Given Assumption 1, both the borrowers will invest in their second projects Thus
Stage 2:
The bank's expected payoff at any period from making a loan is -2. Stage 1:
The tie-breaking rule implies that there will be negative assortative matching. Of course, the expected payoff of the bank is independent of the nature of the matching.
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Summarizing the above discussion, we obtain our first proposition.
Proposition 1: Group-lending without sequential financing is not feasible.
Remark 1: It is clear this analysis goes through even if H>2r.
Group-lending with Sequential Financing:
In every round, the members of the selected group receives loans in a staggered manner, but the selection of the recipient group is independent of history. Consider the following game: Period 0: There is endogenous group-formation whereby the borrowers organize themselves into groups of two. For every t ≥1, there is a two-stage game: Stage 1:
The bank randomly selects one of the groups and lends it one dollar.
Stage 2: One of the borrowers is randomly selected as the recipient of the 1 dollar lent by the bank.
Assumption:
H-r <1, so that this amount is not sufficient to finance the investment in the next stage. B i 's decision:
The game goes to the next stage. • 2 Group-lending with Sequential Financing:
Stage 3:
This stage arises only if B i had invested in 1 in stage 2. The bank lends a further 1 dollar to the group, which is allocated to the other borrower, B j . B j 's decision:
Group-lending with Sequential Financing:
As in the previous subsection, for t ≥1, it is sufficient to restrict attention to one-shot games. Stage 3: Both types of borrowers would invest in their second projects.
Stage 2:
Given that borrowers of both types default in stage 3, in stage 2, S type borrowers will invest in their first projects and N type borrowers will invest in their second projects. Hence,
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Group-lending with Sequential Financing:
Stage 1:
Period 0: Group-formation would lead to negative assortative matching.
Irrespective of the nature of the matching process, the expected per period payoff of the bank is 1 θ.

Proposition 2: Sequential financing is feasible if and only if
Default by the first recipient of the group-loan adversely affects her partner. Hence, for type S borrowers, the social capital is brought into play, so that they invest in their first projects. Thus, the moral hazard problem is resolved partially and grouplending may be feasible, even if there is negative assortative matching.
Group-lending with Sequential Financing:
Remark 2:
Consider the case where, in case the loan goes to a group of type SN, the S type borrower is the first recipient with probability α, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. In this case,
There is negative assortative matching if and only if α≥0.5. Thus, positive assortative matching is more likely when the 'bargaining power' of the S type agents is low, in the sense that α is small.
Contingent Renewal And sequential financing
Contingent Renewal without sequential financing
Selection of the recipient group is history dependent, but in any round, all members of the recipient group receive loans simultaneously. Consider the following game: Period 0: There is endogenous group-formation whereby the borrowers organize themselves into groups of two. For every t ≥1, there is a two-stage game: Stage 1: At t =1, the bank lends some randomly selected group 2 dollars. In case the recipient group at t-1 had repaid its loans, at t the bank makes a repeat loan to this group. In case the recipient group had defaulted at t -1, no member of this group ever obtains a loan. In that case, the bank lends 2 dollars to some randomly selected group, of borrowers who have not defaulted earlier.
Stage 2:
The borrowers simultaneously make their project choice. V ij : expected equilibrium payoff of a type i borrower at period t≥1 if she forms a group with a type j borrower and the group receives the bank loan in period t.
Consider some subgame B i B j . Note that, in any subgame perfect equilibrium, if, in period T, B i invests in her second project, then so must borrower B j (Assumption 1). The present discounted value of the borrowers' payoff from investing in first project for the first t periods and then to deviate:
